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The standard homeowners policy has been in existence in Texas for a
decade. During this period, many cases have reached the appellate courts
of this state construing the terms of this standard policy. Although the
policy form by no means can be considered mature at this time, the judi-
cial decisions are quite adequate in most areas to allow counsel to determine
with reasonable certainty whether a particular property loss is covered by
*LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
TEXAS HOMEOWNERS POLICY
the contract, and, if so, the amount of coverage thereunder This Article
will review the decisions during the last ten years interpreting the prop-
erty section of the Texas homeowners policy Because an understanding of
the contractual language involved is essential to a proper evaluation of the
decisions, reference will first be made to the available policy forms.
I. THE TEXAS HOMEOWNERS FORMS GENERALLY
The homeowners policy may be described as an insurance policy for an
individual resident of a dwelling which provides indemnity against both
property loss and personal liability to third parties. It may be issued to
either the resident owner of the dwelling or a tenant.' Pursuant to statu-
tory authority,4 the State Board of Insurance has promulgated a uniform
homeowners policy, and has prescribed standard forms or endorsements
for attachment thereto1 The first homeowners policy approved by the
State Board of Insurance became effective April 15, 1957. Although
combining the features of both a property and a liability policy, the origi-
nal 1957 homeowners policy was not a total re-creation. It was a com-
posite of then-existing and new provisions, and the basic conditions of the
policy were taken verbatim from those of the Texas standard fire policy."
The present homeowners policy was originally approved for use ef-
fective July 1, 1960. This policy actually consists only of a jacket' or shell
onto which the more important coverage provisions are attached. The
insuring clause and the actual coverage provisions are contained in the
various homeowners forms which are attached to the policy. These home-
owners forms come in five varieties: limited form, broad form, all risk
form, tenants broad form, and tenants all risk form.' These are pure Texas
forms, and, although similar terms are found in homeowners policies else-
' This Article deals only with section 1, the property section of the homeowners policy; no
effort will be made to consider section II (liability coverage).
"Primarily, decisions construing the Texas homeowners policy will be relied on, but, where
helpful, reference will also be made to non-homeowners Texas authorities and to cases from other
jurisdictions.
'The tenant homeowners form is the same in every respect as the owner-occupant form, ex-
cept that the tenant's property coverage is limited to personal property. See Texas General Basis
Schedules, Homeowners Section, approved by the State Board of Insurance, Austin, Texas, July 1,
1964.
4 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 5.35, 5.36 (1951). The mandate of these statutes actually ap-
plies only to the property portion of the policy.
'Only standard forms approved by the Board may be used. See Texas General Basis Schedules,
Homeowners Section, supra note 3.
'These basic conditions are found in the Texas standard fire policy (1949 revision), and are
still in use.
"The jacket consists of the declarations page, referred to as the daily report by the insurance
industry, and the basic conditions. These basic conditions were entirely rewritten in 1960, and are
no longer the same as those of the Texas standard fire policy.
' The limited form (A) covers the dwelling and unscheduled personal property against loss by
fire, extended coverage, vandalism, and theft. The broad form (B) covers the dwelling against
all risks of physical loss (with certain exceptions), and covers unscheduled personal property
against the same named perils as form A. The all-risk form (C) covers the dwelling and un-
scheduled personal property against all risks of physical loss (with certain exceptions). The ten-
ants broad form (form B-T) and the tenant all-risk form (form C-T) are similar to the regular
B and C forms respectively, except that there is no dwelling coverage. See Texas General Basis
Schedules, Homeowners Section, supra note 3. The liability sections of these five homeowners forms
are identical. Id.
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
where, the Texas policy is different in many respects from those policies
in use in other jurisdictions. Out-of-state authorities must be evaluated
with this in mind.
The homeowners broad form (form HO-B) will be analyzed below
in accordance with the existing case law. An understanding of the home-
owners broad-form coverages generally will be useful in deciding coverage
questions under any of the other homeowners forms (the "property in-
sured" portions being practically the same), as well as under the simi-
lar farm and ranch owners policy or other Texas all risk policies, such
as the multi-peril policy used for commercial risks.' The homeowners
broad form is set out hereinafter as an appendix"0 to avoid any confusion
as to the terms of the contract discussed.
II. THE HOMEOWNERS BROAD FORM
A. Property Insured
1. Dwelling. Decisions regarding what property is insured by the home-
owners policy are practically non-existent. Coverage A provides that the
dwelling described on the jacket of the policy, "while occupied by the
Insured principally for dwelling purposes," is the property insured. This
has required no further clarification by the courts, although the quoted
phrase could well be the subject of later judicial clarification." The policy
specifically provides that wall-to-wall carpeting attached to a building
shall be considered a part of the dwelling." The policy also contains a
dwelling extension which provides that ten per cent of the dwelling
coverage may be applied as additional insurance to cover unconnected
private structures located on the premises and used in connection with the
occupancy of the described dwelling."3
The broad form is chosen for detailed analysis because it is by far the most popular form
with the insurance agents and their customers; thus, practically all the reported decisions have
concerned that form. In discussing the broad form, this Article will proceed through the form
in the order in which the provisions appear. Relevant portions of cases will be noted and analyzed
when they concern the particular contractual provision under discussion.
"°The Appendix sets out most of the property section, including the "property insured," the
"perils insured against," and the "extensions of coverage" portions of the form, and should be
considered in conjunction with the interpretive decisions. The homeowners broad form was first
revised effective Nov. 1, 1960, and again effective July 1, 1963. The 1963 revision is presently
used. However, there are no important differences between the 1960 form and the present form
with regard to the "property insured" and "perils insured against" portions of the policy. Thus,
all decisions, regardless of the date, involving the broad form are construing the identical con-
tractual language.
" The phrase "principally for dwelling purposes" is not further defined in the policy or by
the decisions. There is, however, additional guidance on the meaning of the term "occupied by
the Insured." The vacancy clause contained in the basic conditions of the policy jacket provides
that if the insured ceases to reside in the dwelling and the personal property or a substantial part
thereof is removed, the dwelling shall be deemed vacant and the dwelling coverage shall be sus-
pended sixty days thereafter. A vast body of law defining vacancy has developed under the Texas
fire policy. In Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Shepherd, 134 Tex. 669, 137 S.W.2d 996 (1940), which
was recently followed in Knoff v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 447 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969), the court defined "vacant" as meaning without inanimate objects, as opposed to "un-
occupied," which means without human beings. The present homeowners vacancy clause thus
incorporates both of these definitions.
12 This contractual provision changes the contrary holding in Ruby v. Cambridge Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 358 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (fire policy with a physical loss form attached).
1" The dwelling extension contains an exclusion for structures used for commercial, manufac-
turing, or farming purposes, or wholly rented to others. This makes the homeowner's dwelling ex-
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2. Unscheduled Personal Property. Although there are many potential
areas for litigation under the unscheduled personal property coverage
(Coverage B), to date, such litigation reaching the Texas appellate courts
has been negligible. The definition of the personal property insured is
very broad, including all property owned, worn, or used by the insured,
or any member of his family of the same household, and property of
others' while on the premises of the described dwelling. The off-premises
coverage provides that one thousand dollars or ten per cent of the personal
property coverage, whichever is greater, is applicable worldwide. There
are, however, various exclusions for animals and birds, aircraft, motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; outboard motors, watercraft and their
furnishings;" loss of numismatic property in excess of one hundred dol-
lars; and loss of documents, jewelry, furs, and business property in excess
of five hundred dollars. 6
In Texas, the exclusion for business property will undoubtedly pro-
duce litigation, as it has elsewhere. That provision excludes "loss in ex-
cess of $500 . . . of property pertaining to a ranch, farm, business, trade,
profession or occupation of the Insured," and further excludes all such
loss if the property consists of samples or articles for sale or delivery, or
property away from the described premises. Apparently, there are no
Texas cases deciding when property pertains to a business of the insured.
However, that question has received attention elsewhere, generally under
personal property floater policies.' The business property exclusion is,
tension more specific in meaning than the fire policy dwelling extension, which has been construed
on at least two occasions. In Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 359 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.r.e., the court held that a servant's house was covered even though
it had been rented for twenty months to a paying tenant. The result would presumably be the
contrary under the homeowners policy. In Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bass, 443 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969), it was held that there was no coverage for a barn which was under a lease to a
separate tenant. This holding would apply to the homeowners policy.
" Property of roomers or tenants is, however, excepted from the definition of property of others.
"In Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Howsley, 432 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), it was
held that personal property consisting of camping and fishing equipment, clothes, and camera
equipment, lost when two rubber rafts overturned in the Rio Grande River, could not be con-
sidered furnishings or equipment of the rubber raft within the meaning of this exclusion.
" These monetary limitations raise an interesting problem where there is a small loss, since the
policy also normally contains a $50 or $100 deductible clause. For example, suppose that the
policy contains a $100 deductible clause and the insured sustains a $200 loss of numismatic prop-
erty. The loss of numismatic property in excess of $100 is excluded by the policy. It could be
asserted by the insurer that under such circumstances it owed nothing since there was only a
$100 covered loss under the policy and application of the $100 deductible reduced the amount
due the insured to zero. This problem may never be answered by the judiciary, since adjustment
is usually made by first applying the deductible to the entire loss, even though such loss is above
the monetary exclusion, and then making payment up to the policy limitation.
"r There are four decisions which might be of use in predicting which way a Texas court will
decide on this business property exclusion. In Swanstrom v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 100 F.
Supp. 374 (S.D. Cal. 1951), there was held to be no coverage under a personal property floater
policy where the insured placed some of his art objects in his restaurant as decorations. It was
held that the character of the use and not the nature of the property determines whether or not
property pertains to a business. In Jerrel v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 251 Iowa 816, 103 N.W.2d
83 (1960), the property consisted of various newsreel films stored on business premises, and the
court affirmed a jury verdict for the insured on the basis that on the date of the fire, the news
film, having been merely stored there for over ten years, had no essential relationship to the business
of the insured. The court also held that there was coverage for a second fire loss because the first
fire put the insured "out of business permanently." 103 N.W.2d at 86. This reasoning in Jerrel
is not particularly persuasive. In American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Vermont, 115 Ga. App. 663, 155
S.E.2d 675 (1967), it was held that a diamond ring was excluded because it was held for sale,
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however, apparently inapplicable where the property pertains to the busi-
ness of someone other than the insured and is on the premises of the
described dwelling. In such a case coverage is provided at the insured's
option, even for the benefit of others.
B. Perils Insured Against
1. Dwelling. The dwelling, as defined in Coverage A of the policy, is in-
sured against "ALL RISKS OF PHYSICAL LOSS except as otherwise
excluded." Thus, it is the policy exclusions which are generally determi-
native of peril-coverage questions. However, the question does arise as
to whether a loss comes within the all risks insuring clause. It has been
stated that there is no Texas case that defines the term "All Risks of
Physical Loss," and that it should not be given a restrictive meaning."
However, the authorities generally"' support two implied prerequisites
for a loss to qualify under this clause: (1) that it be of a fortuitous na-
ture, and (2) that it not be caused by willful or fraudulent conduct of
the insured."
In Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Murrell," a suit based on the
now-extinct Texas standard comprehensive dwelling policy, a loss was
alleged to have been caused by earth movement or landslide underneath
a dwelling. The court was faced with the insurer's contention that such
damage was not a "risk" because it was not fortuitous. It was asserted
that from the day the house was built it was certain that the damage
would occur, and that it was therefore inevitable. The court rejected this
contention, apparently on the basis that no one had knowledge that the
damage was inevitable at the time the contract was executed.
The Murrell decision was followed in Employers Casualty Co. v. Holm,"
an action upon a homeowners policy. In Holm a shower stall was con-
structed without a shower pan, which, as the parties stipulated, made it
inevitable that water would pass into and under the insured's flooring.
This was held to be a fortuitous risk-of-loss, since the parties also stipu-
lated that neither the insurer nor the insured knew at the time the con-
tract of insurance was made that there was no shower pan." This holding
represents an extension of Murrell, in which the risk was held to be for-
notwithstanding the fact that the ring had no relationship to the usual business of the insured.
In Riddle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 So. 2d 820 (La. Ct. App. 1968), coverage was afforded where
the manager of a retail merchandising establishment placed his own bookends, lamp, and desk set
in his office to "spruce it up." Id. at 823.
"Fidelity S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Crow, 390 S.W.2d 788, 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref.
n.r.e.
"9See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1122, 1125 (1963).
"0Texas would undoubtedly follow the rule that fraudulent losses are impliedly excluded from
an all risks policy as a matter of public policy, since this has always been the rule under a fire
insurance policy. Greenfeld v. San Jacinto Ins. Co., 319 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Jones v. Fid.
& Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), error ref. See also Bryant v. Trinity
Universal Ins. Co., 411 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
2' 362 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.r.e., 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1963).
22 393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
"The sole dissenting judge in Holm was of the opinion that the loss lacked the element of
chance required to make it a risk of loss. 393 S.W.2d at 368.
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tuitous because the court was not shown that anyone knew, at the time
the insurance contract was executed, that the loss was inevitable. In Holm
the court was interested only in the absence of knowledge by the insured
and the insurer.' Thus, it can be seen that, as a practical matter, the
requisite knowledge needed to keep a risk from being fortuitous has
evolved from general knowledge, to specific knowledge in the mind of
the insured or the insurer.
The Holm decision demonstrates that it will be a rare case indeed
where a Texas court will find that a loss is not covered under the all risks
clause because it was nonfortuitous. However, Holm does tend to com-
bine the risk-of-loss issue with the question of whether the loss is ex-
cluded by the inherent vice provision contained within the policy,5 mak-
ing it difficult at times to know which the court is really discussing. It
seems to this writer that the inherent vice exclusion, as well as the other
exclusions, are far more comprehensive than the nonfortuitous risk argu-
ment rejected in Holm. Thus, it is actually the exclusions which define
the coverage, and if an insured can escape successfully the effect of the
excluded perils, then his chances of recovery under the all risks clause are
good.
2. Unscheduled Personal Property. Unlike the all risk coverage on the
dwelling, the homeowners broad form provides personal property cover-
age only against loss from specific and separately named perils. Because
most of these perils are the same as those found in a fire insurance policy
and its special endorsements, or in a personal property floater policy, they
will not be separately considered in this Article.
Loss from "collapse of building or any part thereof" is, however, an
important peril listed in the homeowners policy which merits discussion.
This peril is important not only as a personal-property-coverage peril,
but also in understanding the ensuing loss exception to the exclusions,
which is applicable to both the dwelling and personal property coverages.
In Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Nelson' the supreme court held
that the term "collapse" is not a word of art, but is generally understood
to mean to fall or shrink together, cave in, or fall into a flattened, dis-
torted, or disorganized state. The court defined the collapse of a dwelling
as follows: "[A] sinking, bulging, breaking or pulling away of the foun-
24 The correctness of this result under Texas law as it then existed is questionable. The court
quoted from the Restatement of Contracts as follows: " 'A fortuitous event within the meaning
of the present and subsequent [s]ections, is an event which so far as the parties to the contract
are aware, is dependent on chance . . .; it may even be a past event, as the loss of a vessel, pro-
vided that the fact is unknown to the parties.' " 393 S.W.2d at 368. Texas law was to the con-
trary, as the cases indicate that it was against the public policy of Texas to allow, insurance to
be written after a loss had occurred, and this was true even though both parties were ignorant of
the true facts. H. Schumacker Oil Works, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 239 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1957); Hulen v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), holding
approved; Alliance Ins. Co. v. Continental Gin Co., 285 S.W. 257 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926),
holding approved; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 215 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
Contra, Burch v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1970) (adopting
new rule for Texas).
'5See text accompanying notes 55-58 infra.
26361 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1962).
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dation or walls or other support so as materially to impair their function
and to render the house unfit for habitation.""7 Although the above defi-
nition was applied to a non-homeowners insurance contract, it seems
equally applicable to the homeowners policy.
One other peril in the homeowners policy which has been particularly
troublesome is "mysterious disappearance." This term, like "collapse of
building," is used both in defining an insured peril and in expressing the
limits of an exclusion. Although much has been written on mysterious
disappearance in other jurisdictions, 8 the appellate courts of Texas have
not yet reported a decision defining the term. It is expected that we have
not heard the last from the underwriters' draftsmen concerning this sub-
ject.
III. THE EXCLUDED PERILS
Under the general heading of "Perils Insured Against," the policy pro-
vides that the insurance does not cover loss caused by eleven, separately-
lettered exclusions, a through k, some of which have many subparts and
all of which are subject to further exceptions. These eleven exclusions ap-
ply to both dwelling and personal property coverages, unless the exclusion
itself expressly states otherwise. The important exclusions will be treated
separately below, and the discussion under each will be preceded by the
actual wording of the exclusion.
A. Water
d. Loss caused by or resulting from:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water or tidal wave, overflow
of streams or other bodies of water, or spray from any of the fore-
going, all whether driven by wind or not;
(2) water which backs up through sewers or drains;
(3) water below the surface of the ground including that which exerts
pressure on (or flows, seeps or leaks through) sidewalks, driveways,
swimming pools, foundations, walls, basements or other floors, or
through doors, windows or any other openings in such sidewalks,
driveways, foundations, walls or floors;
1. Surface Water. In Hardware Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Berg-
lund the supreme court re-affirmed the vitality of the surface water ex-
clusion. Berglund developed out of the damage caused by Hurricane Carla
in 1961. The suit was based on both a "named peril" and an all risks policy.
Both policies had somewhat similar surface water exclusions, and as con-
cerns the homeowners all risks policy, exclusion d (1) was as above quoted.
The court was confronted not only with conflicting civil appeals de-
cisions growing out of the Hurricane Carla disaster, but also with the
argument that under an all risks policy the burden of proof should be on
the insurer to establish that the loss came within an exclusion, notwith-
27 id. at 709.
2"See, e.g., Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 865 (1967).
2393 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1965).
[Vol. 24
1970] TEXAS HOMEOWNERS POLICY
standing rule 94 and the prior case law tacitly recognized by that rule."
It was also contended by the insured that loss proximately caused by hurri-
cane should not be construed as coming within the surface water exclu-
sion. The court, however, relying upon mature Texas authority," rejected
these arguments and held that the surface water exclusion was applicable
to loss caused by a hurricane. The submission of the case to the jury in
Berglund is interesting in that the parties stipulated the total amount of
damages caused by the hurricane. The jury was then asked to determine
the percentage of damage which was caused by water, and the trial court
then rendered judgment for the remainder of the stipulated damages. Such
a submission had the effect of placing on the insurer the burden of proof
in establishing that the damage was within the exclusion. The supreme
court in Berglund re-affirmed the proposition that the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to demonstrate that the loss is not attributable to the
excluded hazards is on the insured." Because the burden of persuading
the jury is a consequence of the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence," the trial court's submission was actually erroneous."
Since the Berglund decision, the appellate courts seem to have applied
the surface water exclusion with little difficulty. Cambridge Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Shoemake" was decided by the burden of proof. There,
the insured drowned in a lake, and there were no eyewitnesses available to
testify to the incident. Presumably, items of personal property were lost
in the lake. The evidence indicated that on the day in question there were
high winds and waves on the lake. Because of the absence of eyewitness
testimony or other competent evidence, the court held that the plaintiff
TiEx. R. Civ. P. 94 provides in part:
Where the suit is on an insurance contract which insures against certain general
hazards, but contains other provisions limiting such general liability, the party suing
on such contract shall never be required to allege that the loss was not due to a risk
or cause coming within any of the exceptions specified in the contract, nor shall
the insurer be allowed to raise such issue unless it shall specifically allege that the
loss was due to a risk or cause coming within a particular exception to the general
liability; provided that nothing herein shall be construed to change the burden of
proof on such issues as it now exists. (Emphasis added.)
"The court relied principally upon Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S.W. 973 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1920), holding approved, and then stated: "The exclusion clauses involved in this suit have
been used as a part of property insurance policies for many years. . . . Since the decision in the
Coyle case, the construction of the exclusionary clause must be regarded as settled in Texas." 393
S.W.2d at 311.
"This same rule was stated in Paulson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 393 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1965), de-
cided the same day as Berglund, and was well established prior to that date. See, e.g., Shaver
v. National Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1962); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 157 Tex. 121, 300 S.W.2d 68 (1957).
'sBoswell v. Pannell, 107 Tex. 433, 180 S.W. 593 (1915). The affirmative of the issue means
the legal affirmative, not the literal affirmative, and thus includes the proving of a material nega-
tive. Rosenthal Dry Goods Co. v. Hillebrahdt, 7 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928), holding
approved.
'Cf., e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (trial
court's judgment for the insured upon a jury verdict was reversed and remanded because of the
failure of the special issues to exclude loss coming within the policy exclusions); Wheelock v.
American Fire & Cas. Co., 414 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e. (alternative
holding to the effect that the insured had the duty under Tax. R. CiV. P. 279 to tender requested
issues excluding loss from an excluded peril, since such was a part of his basis for recovery).
Wheelock is interesting since the insured, under a fire and extended coverage policy, unsuccessfully
contended that loss by waves did not come within the high water exclusion. The homeowners form
remedies this problem by expressly excluding loss from waves in d(1).
5 403 S.W,2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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failed to sustain her burden of proving that the loss was not caused by
water. The court concluded that it was logical to assume that an ordinary
boat would not capsize due to the action of wind without corresponding
rough waves. An interesting variation on this theme is found in Employers
Fire Insurance Co. v. Howsley, " where the insured was using two rubber
rafts which overturned and deposited various items of personal property
into the Rio Grande River. The insured testified that the two life rafts
in question came to rest on a rock and that a gust of wind flipped them
over. The appellate court, in affirming a summary judgment, held that
the wind, not the water, caused the loss. The court stated that the water
was involved only as the recipient of the goods when the rafts capsized,
and, in effect, held that such was "friendly water," which does not come
within the exclusion.
2. Sewer Water. Apparently a Texas appellate court has not had oc-
casion to apply the sewer back-up exclusion. However, applying the
rationale of Berglund, that loss in any way caused by water is excluded,
there should be little difficulty in deciding when this exclusion is appli-
cable."7
3. Sub-Surface Water. In Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Gutbries the
above, sub-surface water exclusion was considered for the first time. The
insured's position was that an air conditioner leaked condensated water on
the floor of his dwelling, and the water drained through the floor and
down into the ground around the foundation, causing portions of his
house to sink. The court held that the sub-surface water exclusion was
effective as applied to this loss, and that the insured failed to establish the
amount of his loss not so excluded. 9
Guthrie was followed and cited with approval in Park v. Hanover In-
surance Co.,4" where a water line was split underneath the foundation of
a house, causing a softening of the sub-soil and a shifting of the dwell-
ing's foundation. The insureds asserted that exclusion d(3) did not apply,
arguing that it was applicable only to water of natural origin. They also
contended that the initial and proximate cause of the loss was the acci-
dental leakage of the water, and that the water below the surface of the
ground was merely a successive link in the chain of causation between the
initial cause and the loss. The court rejected both of these contentions,
36432 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
a See, e.g., Kane v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 214 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Tex. 1963),
where, in a suit on a non-homeowners policy, it was alleged that the insured's damage was caused
by an overflow from defective or obstructed sewage lines. The court seemed to be impressed with
the fact that the policy contained no such exclusion, although a renewal policy, effective after the
loss, contained an exclusion for loss caused by water which backs up through sewers or drains.
In Jackson v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 151 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d
395 (4th Cir. 1969), the above quoted exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy was held ap-
plicable to a North Carolina loss,
38427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
" The court also relied upon exclusion h in reaching its result. See text accompanying note 64
infra.
40443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), error ref. n.r.e,
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observing that the water came from below the surface of the ground and
remained below the surface, and that the underground water was the di-
rect, and not a remote, cause.
Considering both Gutbrie and Park together, a couple of definite rules
concerning the sub-surface water exclusion are apparent. The exclusion
is applicable to all sources of water, whether natural or artificial, and to
water which originates either above or below the ground, provided the
damage results from the water's being below the surface of the ground.
Thus, if the underground water's source is an above-ground plumbing or
air-conditioning system, 1 a rusted underground pipe,' or merely a leaky
outdoor water faucet, any loss resulting therefrom is excluded.
B. Freezing
e. Loss caused by or resulting from freezing while the building is unoccu-
pied unless the Insured shall have exercised due diligence with respect to
maintaining beat in the building or unless plumbing, heating and air-con-
ditioning systems had been drained and the water supply shut off during
such unoccupancy;
It was held in International Insurance Co. v. Reid " that the phrase "un-
less the Insured shall have exercised due diligence" requires only that the
insured personally use due diligence. Thus, the insured can entrust re-
sponsibility to an agent and recover under the policy, even though his
agent fails to exercise due diligence. In the opinion of this writer, the
Reid case is wrong on both principle and authority,' and a contrary re-
sult by a different court of civil appeals' under a similar policy consider-
ably weakens its persuasiveness. Therefore, serious doubt exists concern-
ing whether an insured can merely delegate the authority to protect his
unoccupied dwelling to an agent and then not be bound by that agent's
conduct. In Reid it was agreed by the parties that the building was un-
41 Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
4Park v. Hanover Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
4Sharp v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Cause No. 66-7247-A (14th Judicial Dist. Ct., Dallas
County, Texas, Dec. 8, 1967). In that case the court rendered a summary judgment based on ex-
clusion d(3) prior to the Gutbrie case or any other reported decision on this exclusion.
44400 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.e.
45 Without any analysis, the court in Reid merely stated that insurance policies should be in-
terpreted strictly against the insurer, citing Provident Wash. Ins. Co. v. Proflfitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239
S.W.2d 379 (1951), and that such a strict construction required that only the insured use due
diligence. That rule of construction has long since been repudiated, with the correct rule being
that strict construction against the insurer applies only when the policy is ambiguous. Thus, in
construing an unambiguous contract, neither party is favored over the other simply because the
agreement is one of indemnity. Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309
(Tex. 1965); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 361 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1962); Transport Ins.
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 161 Tex. 93, 337 S.W.2d 284 (1960); Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 157
Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957).
4SIn Fort Worth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Willham, 406 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error
ref. n.r.e., a judgment for the insured was reversed and remanded where the evidence showed that
although the water was once turned off, somone turned it back on prior to a freeze. The court
held that it was encumbent on the insured to show that whoever turned the water back on was
not under his control. Although Willham was decided under a fire insurance policy with a physical
loss form attached and containing a provision that "this insurance shall not be prejudiced by any
act or neglect of any person .. .when such act or neglect is not within the control of the named
insured," [Id. at 80] such a provision, which is only in the negative, can not by itself account for
the opposite result in this case.
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
occupied; thus, a definition of that term as applied to the pipe-freezing ex-
clusion will have to await another decision.47
In one case the insured relied upon exclusion e to show that his freezing
loss was covered." He reasoned that the "extremes of temperature" langu-
age in exclusion i was incompatible with exclusion e, and that exclusion e
indicated that freezing was an insured peril in certain circumstances.
However, the court held that exclusions do not create coverage, and that
the loss was otherwise excluded by the policy.
C. Inherent Defects
i. Loss caused by inherent vice, wear and tear, deterioration; rust, rot, mould,
or other fungi; dampness of atmosphere, extremes of temperature; con-
tamination; vermin, termites, moths or other insects;
Of all the exclusions in the homeowners policy, exclusion i has prob-
ably been the most troublesome. In part, this has been due to the fact
that it actually consists of a number of separate, but related, exclusions.
It has also on occasion been confused with the nonfortuitous risk argu-
ment, 4  and it has created more difficulties with regard to the ensuing loss
exception to the exclusions than has any other exclusion. "
1. Deterioration. In perhaps the first decision under this exclusion, Trav-
elers Indemnity Co. v. Jarrett,5 the court seemed more concerned with
deciding what was the proximate cause of the loss than with understand-
ing the exclusion. In that case lightning opened a circuit breaker in the
insured's house, causing food to spoil and damage the refrigerator. Al-
though the court seemed to recognize that the damage to the food was
caused by deterioration, rot, and mould, it held that the policy excluded
only loss from "inherent" deterioration of the property insured. Thus, the
exclusion prevented recovery for the damaged food, but not for the
damaged refrigerator. Jarrett has never been cited nor followed on this
point, and is clearly wrong. The adjective "inherent" does not modify
every noun in the exclusion, and certainly not those past the first semi-
colon. This was a clear case for the application of the "rust, rot, mould, or
other fungi" exclusion.
2. Rust, Rot, Mould or Other Fungi. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
47 In Fort Worth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Willham, 406 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), there
also was no question but that the dwelling was unoccupied. Texas will probably follow Phoenix
Assur. Co. v. Shepherd, 115 S.W.2d 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff'd, 134 Tex. 669, 137 S.W.2d
996 (1940), which defined "unoccupied" as meaning "without persons using the [building] for
the purposes for which it was adopted." Id. at 671, 137 S.W.2d at 997. The question of how
permanent the absence must be in order to make this exclusion applicable has not yet been decided
in Texas. Logically, the test for unoccupancy under this exclusion should not be as strict as under
the vacancy clause, discussed in note 11 supra, since a vacancy suspends all dwelling coverage and
there is no requirement under this exclusion that the personal property be removed.
4 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Voiding, 426 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
n.r.e.
" See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
8" The ensuing loss exception is discussed below in text accompanying notes 75-89 infra.
5' 369 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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Yates" a United States court of appeals had no difficulty in finding that ex-
clusion i was applicable to a situation where the joists, sills, and sub-floor-
ing of the insured's home were almost completely rotted away because the
crawl space underneath the house was inadequately vented. The court indi-
cated that this loss fell within just about any part of exclusion i that one
cared to mention. However, it is clear that the court found that the rot
exclusion was most applicable.
3. Inherent Vice. In Employers Casualty Co. v. Holm55 the application of
exclusion i to damage resulting from a shower stall constructed without a
shower pan was considered. It was admitted by both parties that this was
an inherent vice. Thus, the case was actually decided upon the application
of the ensuing loss exception to this exclusion, which is discussed later in
this Article. The court in Holm had occasion to define the term "inherent
vice": "[It] does not relate to an extraneous cause but to a loss entirely
from internal decomposition or some quality which brings about its own
injury or destruction. The vice must be inherent in the property for
which recovery is sought."5
This inherent vice definition' was accepted verbatim and applied in
State Farm Fire &3 Casualty Co. v. Volding." There, the insured's bricks,
which were too porous, became saturated with water and cracked or spalled
when the temperature dropped below freezing. The court held that the
porous condition of the brick was a fault or defect which may properly
be labeled an "inherent vice" in the insured property and which was a
cause of its own injury or destruction, in that such injury or destruction
would not have occurred except for the vice.
The application of the inherent vice exclusion to the facts of the above
case has not gone without criticism. One writer has suggested that since,
in addition to the porous condition of the bricks, it took the water and
a freeze to cause the damage, it did not appear that the loss was caused
entirely from some internal quality of the property within the Holm in-
herent vice definition.s7 This same argument was presented by the in-
sured in Volding and rejected by the court without comment. It is sub-
mitted that in determining the inherent vice question, the insured object
may not be considered in an absolute vacuum in which not even rot or
decomposition could occur, but rather the object must be considered in its
normal, customary environment. Volding's brick was used on exterior
surfaces in Dallas, Texas, inevitably exposing it to both rain and freezing
temperatures. Therefore, it was certain from the moment that the brick
52 344 F.2d 939 (Sth Cir. 1965).
53393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
54Id. at 367.
" It should be noted that the policy also contains a specific inherent vice definition for me-
chanical devices. Exclusion h excludes loss to such devices caused by their own mechanical break-
down. In Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), repair
costs for an air-conditioning unit were claimed when they were necessitated by the air condition-
er's malfunction. The court held that this was excluded without stating which exclusion it was
relying on.
"'426 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"
7Davis, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 122, 132-33 (1969).
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walls were constructed that the very damage sued for would occur. Hence,
it was inevitable, and, in the opinion of this writer, constituted a loss
caused by an inherent vice.
One troublesome and unanswered problem concerning the inherent vice
exclusion is its application to those parts of the insured property sur-
rounding the vice. For example, if Volding's falling brick from his chim-
ney had damaged his roof, would this be excluded as being caused by in-
herent vice, or would that exclusion apply only to the brick? In other
words, is the inherent vice exclusion so different from the other exclusions
that its breadth is limited to that very item of property containing the
vice and to no others? The indications of the authorities are conflicting."
The writer feels that the exclusion has some application to parts of the
insured property other than the one containing the vice, particularly if
the parts are contiguous. If this were not the case, then there would be
no need for the ensuing loss exception to the inherent vice exclusion.
4. Extremes of Temperature. The court in State Farm Fire &q Casualty
Co. v. Volding" also held that "the extremes of temperature" portion of
exclusion i was applicable. This application was foretold by the earlier de-
cision of the same court in McKool v. Reliance Insurance Co."8 In that
case the same exclusion was held applicable to a loss which was caused by
the freezing of water in a swimming pool and the cracking of ceramic tile
affixed to the walls of the pool.
5. Contamination. The contamination portion of exclusion i will un-
doubtedly be construed in the same manner as was done by the supreme
court in McConnell Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of St. Lois,1 which
involved an "all risks" builders risk policy. In that case the damage re-
sulted from the application of muriatic acid to brick flooring, which emit-
ted chemical fumes and adversely affected the metal structure of the
dwelling. The court held that contamination means a mixing of sub-
stances which results in an impure mixture, and that it was not to be con-
fused with corrosion. The court noted that although it may be possible
under certain situations for corrosion to also be classified as contamination,
such was not the case in McConnell. Oxidation was given as an example
of corrosion. Of course, exclusion i also excludes loss from rust; thus,
this form of corrosion would be excluded by the homeowners policy.
However, as in McConnell, it would seem possible under the homeowners
"' Travelers Indem. Co. v. Jarrett, 369 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), erroneously limits
all of exclusion i to items containing the vice, making the ensuing loss exception to exclusion i an
unwarranted duplication. Employers Cas. Co. v. Holm, 393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
only appears to so limit the inherent vice exclusion, because the court actually found coverage
only after invoking the ensuing water damage exception. This would, of course, have been un-
necessary if the inherent vice exclusion had application only to the defective item, the absent
shower pan. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yates, 344 F.2d 939 (sth Cir. 1965), and Park v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), lend support for the idea that a loss caused
by inherent vice in another part of the structure is nevertheless excluded.
59426 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
e0386 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error dismissed.
01428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1968).
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policy to have a loss caused by some type of corrosion which would not
come within the provisions of exclusion i, and thus would be covered by
the policy.
D. Settling, Cracking, etc.
k. Loss [to the dwelling] caused by settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage,
or expansion of foundations, walls, floors, ceilings, roof structures, walks,
drives, curbs, fences, retaining walls or swimming pools.
Surprising as it may seem, exclusion k has not been particularly trouble-
some for the courts. This exclusion, unlike any of the other lettered ex-
clusions, applies only to the dwelling coverage. As to the application of
this exclusion the die was well cast when the supreme court decided Em-
ployers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Nelson." Although that case did not in-
volve a homeowners policy, it did define "settling" in an exclusion similar
to that in the homeowners policy. The trial court had submitted an issue
on settling which did not include the other words of the exclusion, such
as "expansion," and the supreme court found this to be reversible error.
Further, the insured took the position that if anything expanded, it was
the soil under the foundation, and not the foundation itself. The supreme
court disagreed, stating that for the purpose of this exclusion, the support-
ing soil must be considered an integral part of the foundation.
The supreme court having apparently indicated its thinking on a set-
tling exclusion,6 six years passed without an appellate opinion on the
specific settling exclusion contained in the homeowners policy. Then, in
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Gutbrie," the question was presented
whether the homeowners settling exclusion was applicable where the set-
tling was caused by a sudden, accidental, fortuitous, and unanticipated
overflow of water from an air conditioning unit which saturated the sub-
soil beneath the foundation of a dwelling. It was held that the exclusion
was applicable. Gutbrie was cited recently with approval in Park v. Han-
over Insurance Co.,"' wherein the initial cause of the settlement was a
break in an underground water line. In these two cases, the contention of
each insured was not that the facts did not literally come within the ex-
clusion, but rather that the settling was actually the result of some other
cause, which should be considered the proximate cause of the loss, thus
making the exclusion inapplicable. It can be seen from these two cases
that such an argument has been unsuccessful, and that if the damages
62361 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1962). In Nelson the exclusion only related to "normal" settling.
Thus, the settling exclusion in the present homeowners policy must be considered broader than
the one in Nelson.
63 Shortly after Nelson, the court again expressed itself on a similar problem under a non-
homeowners policy. See Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Murrell, 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1963),
which was a suit upon the now-obsolete, comprehensive dwelling policy. The court, in a per curiam
opinion, refused the application for writ of error, n.r.e., and stated that its refusal was not to be
construed as an approval of the intermediate court's holding [362 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962)] that loss due to expansion of earth beneath a slab foundation was not excluded by the
terms of the policy.
64427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
65443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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claimed constitute settling, then there is no coverage, regardless of the
reason why the house in fact settled.
The correctness of this proposition is demonstrated by an analysis of
the Berglund decision. In Berglund loss from wind was covered, but loss
from water was specifically excluded. The insured contended that Hurri-
cane Carla was the proximate cause of the loss, including the loss from
water, and thus all the hurricane damage was covered. This contention
was rejected by the court, which stated that there is a great deal of dif-
ference between a hazard that is merely not covered by a policy (that is,
a risk upon which the policy is silent or for which no coverage has been
purchased), and a hazard expressly excluded by the policy. Thus, the
particular hazard which might be considered the initial cause is unim-
portant; if the loss is directly caused by the excluded hazard, then there
is no coverage under the policy. Applying this to the settling situation,
it can be concluded that if the insured's loss is caused by settling-that is,
if the damage consists of settling damage-then there is no coverage under
the homeowners policy, regardless of what initially causes the house to
settle."6
One additional feature of exclusion k is that it excludes loss caused
solely by cracking or any of the other excluded hazards mentioned there-
in, notwithstanding the absence of settling. In McKool v. Reliance In-
surance Co.,"7 where water froze in a swimming pool and caused the pool
wall to crack, it was held that such loss was excluded by the cracking por-
tion of exclusion k. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Voiding s the
same court, and the same judge writing the opinion, reached what at first
reading might be considered a contrary holding. It will be recalled that
in Voiding the separation of bricks was due to water absorption and freez-
ing. The court's entire opinion on this point was as follows: "We do not
agree with the appellant's contention that the loss was caused by 'crack-
ing' and therefore within the purview of Exclusion k."" The explanation
for this seemingly inconsistent result is that although the parties spoke
of the bricks cracking, they in fact "spalled," so that only the exposed
face of the brick chipped off leaving the greater portion intact and in no
way affecting the structural integrity of the walls. The insured argued
that there was no cracking, since the definition of "crack" is to break or
split, usually without complete separation of parts; that is, a flaw, a par-
tial fracture, or a fissure. Ironically, this definition is correct."6 Thus, it
must be admitted that the court was likewise correct in holding that there
was no cracking. This distinction between cracking and spalling is indeed
"6 It should perhaps be noted that the above analysis is not universally accepted by the courts,
and, in particular, it seems to have been partially rejected in California. A California homeowners
policy covering all risks of physical loss but excluding settling still covers the settling damage if
the dominant or proximate cause of the settling is a non-excluded peril. Sabella v. Wisler, 59
Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). This is the same proximate cause argument
that was rejected by the Supreme Court of Texas in Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund,
393 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1965), and Paulson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 393 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1965).
67386 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error dismissed.
' 426 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
69 1d. at 909.
0WEBsTE's NEw WORLD DrCTIONARv 342 (College ed. 1964).
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a fine one, and the two could, in some cases, tend to overlap. If, however,
a loss consists of true cracking, as properly defined, then McKool con-
trols, and no coverage is afforded by the policy.
IV. THE ENSUING Loss EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONS
The foregoing Exclusions a through k shall not apply to ensuing loss caused
by fire, smoke or explosion and Exclusions i, j and k shall not apply to ensu-
ing loss caused by collapse of building, or any part thereof, water damage or
breakage of glass which constitutes a part of the building, provided such
losses would otherwise be covered under this policy.
The application of the above "ensuing loss" exception to the exclusions
presents one of the most difficult areas in construing the homeowners
policy. It has caused many an attorney to jump to the conclusion that
an insured's water damage is covered, although as shown by many of
the cases discussed above, this is not necessarily the case. This ensuing loss
exception was construed apparently for the first time in Texas in McKool
v. Reliance Insurance Co.7 '
A. Ensuing Water Damage
In McKool it was contended that ice in a swimming pool which cracked
the pool walls was actually solidified water, thus making the ensuing water
damage portion of the exception applicable. The court disagreed, stating
that "ensuing losses" are only those losses which follow or come after-
wards as a consequence. The court explained its holding with the fol-
lowing illustration:
In other words, the tile having cracked because of the extreme cold or ice,
there could be no recovery therefor, but if water had entered through the
cracks thus caused, the ensuing damage caused by the entry of the water
would be recoverable. That would be a loss caused by water damage ensuing
after the uninsured cracking of the tile."2
It has been indicated that the meaning of the phrase "ensuing loss caused
by... water damage" is not the same as ensuing loss caused by water. In
other words, the phrase "water damage" conveys the meaning of direct
intrusion of water, rather than mere steam, moisture in the air, or water
vapor, which are insufficient to invoke the exception."m Also, if the excluded
hazard and the water damage occur at the same time, then the ensuing loss
exception is inapplicable, since it requires that these two events be at least
in some sense separate.74
The insured's argument in Park v. Hanover Insurance Co."' presents
the classical illustration of a backward application of the ensuing loss ex-
ception. As will be recalled, that case resulted from a broken underground
water line that caused the dwelling to settle. The insured argued that there
' 386 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error dismissed.
2 Id. at 345-46.
3 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yates, 344 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1965).
74 Id.
75443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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was ensuing water damage and thus coverage afforded by the policy. But
this argument reverses the required causation. The water damage caused
the settling; the settling did not cause the water damage. If, for example,
settling had caused an above-ground pipe to break, which caused above-
the-ground water damage, then there would be loss caused by ensuing
water damage, and the settling exclusion would not exclude the ensuing
water damage. This, however, does not mean that the settling damage
would then be covered, because only the ensuing direct water damage is
covered under the policy."6
The most questionable application of the ensuing loss exception oc-
curred in Employers Casualty Co. v. Holm," where the builder failed to
install a shower pan under the shower stall. The court treated this as an
inherent vice within the meaning of exclusion i, but allowed recovery for
what it considered the ensuing water damage. The parties had stipulated
that water passing into and under the wood flooring caused the flooring
to rot and deteriorate, and the court observed that it was a matter of com-
mon knowledge that the continual application of water to wooden flooring
would cause warping, cracking, and water damage thereto, which would
finally result in rot and deterioration. The court then made this curious
statement: "The loss which ensued or followed the water damage grew
out of and was caused by water damage. Hence the exception or ex-
clusion to the exclusion (i) should apply.""
The Holm case actually presents the problem of the damage being one
more length down the line in the chain of causation. Admittedly, water
damage, or damage resulting from the direct intrusion of water, ensuing
from an inherent vice, in this case the absence of a shower pan, is covered
because of the exception to the exclusion. But the court allowed coverage
for the ensuing rot and deterioration, about which the exception says
nothing. In the opinion of this writer, if ensuing water damage causes rot,
mould, or deterioration, then the case is back within exclusion i and the
loss is not covered.' Because of the exception, the insured is allowed to
recover only for the water damage, such as a wet or water-stained carpet
" McKool v. Reliance Ins. Co., 386 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error dismissed; Em-
ployers Cas. Co. v. Holm, 393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
7'393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
7
8 id. at 366.
"
9 The writer's position is supported by Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yates, 344 F.2d 939 (5th
Cir. 1965), wherein the court indicated that a construction of the policy as in Holm would make
the exclusions practically meaningless, since in a philosophical sense it would not be easy to find
a case of rot which could not also be classified as water damage. The court stated "[i]n our case
the rot may have ensued from water but not from water damage .... " Id. at 941. Thus, Yates
demonstrates that the exception is limited to water damage, and that other damage which ensues
therefrom, or more appropriately, from the water itself, must be tested as to coverage by the
exclusions themselves. In other words, the key word in the phrase "ensuing loss caused by water
damage" is "damage." The insurer is not stating that it will pay for all loss caused by water, but
rather only for that loss caused by water damage, such as wet or stained property. Damage that
occurs considerably after the water event, such as rot or settling, is not covered. Also, the settling
cases of Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), and Park
v. Hanover, 443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), demonstrate conclusively that where a vice
causes a water leak which causes settling, the loss is excluded. Obviously, the result must be the
same where a vice causes a water leak which causes rot or deterioration.
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or floor, " but not for losses further ensuing therefrom.81 As the amount
there in controversy was small and one judge dissented, 2 one should place
little reliance upon this portion of Holm.
B. Other Ensuing Loss
All of the above cases have concerned ensuing water damage. However,
the ensuing loss exception is not limited to water damage. It provides that
none of the exclusions apply to ensuing loss caused by fire, smoke, or
explosion. Thus, if any of the excluded hazards cause, for example, a
fire, then the fire damage is covered. Also, exclusions i, j, and k do not
apply to ensuing loss caused by the collapse of a building or breakage of
glass. Thus, in order to circumvent the settling exclusion, it is occasionally
argued in a settling case that the dwelling has actually suffered a col-
lapse.8" But this is not an easy task, because to establish a collapse one must
establish a sinking, bulging, breaking, or pulling away of the foundation
or walls or other support so as materially to impair their function and
render the house unfit for habitation." If the insured continues to live
in the house, or could live in same, then there is no collapse.
C. The Proviso
Although it probably adds little to the result achieved in any given case,
mention should perhaps be made of the proviso to the exception to the
exclusions, which states that the exception is applicable only if the loss
would otherwise be covered by the policy. Regarding the water damage
portion of the exception, it has been mentioned that the exception is ap-
plicable where the particular water did not come within any portion of
exclusion d (the water exclusion).' Likewise, in Park v. Hanover Insur-
ance Co.s" it was mentioned that the exception, there also called a saving
clause, did not remove exclusion k from the case, since the loss was not
"otherwise covered" because the sub-surface water came within exclusion
d(3). Of course, if a loss is not fortuitous, then the loss also would not be
"otherwise covered" within the proviso. 7 The proviso is really only help-
ful in clarifying the intent of the exception, as it will never, by itself,
vary the coverage result in a particular case. This is because there is never
any coverage for a nonfortuitous loss, and the water exclusion (d) is ex-
pressly made not subject to the ensuing water damage exception. There-
'
0Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
8' Holm thus reverses the proper causation chain on this last item of damage. There was rot
and deterioration ensuing after water damage, but the policy states that it will cover water dam-
age ensuing from rot, deterioration, or other vices. Thus, Holm is inconsistent with McKool v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 386 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error dismissed. Further, it was spe-
cifically held in Park v. Hanover Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), that
where a vice caused a water leak which caused settling, it could not be said that the insured's loss
resulted from "ensuing water damage."
sa See note 23 supra.
3 See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 427 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 361 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1962).
" Employers Cas. Co. v. Holm, 393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
86443 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).




fore, if the water exclusion applies, there is no coverage and the inquiry
ends.
However, it is precisely this idea, that some exclusions are subject to the
water damage or collapse portion of the ensuing loss exception while others
are not, that causes the apparent inconsistency between exclusion e (freez-
ing in an unoccupied building) and the extremes of temperature exclusion
as construed in McKool v. Reliance Insurance Co." As mentioned above,
it has been argued that the extremes of temperature exclusion as con-
strued in McKool is incompatible with the language of exclusion e, which
impliedly indicates that freezing is a peril insured against under certain
circumstances. s9 This argument is, however, erroneous. It is suggested that
the reason for this apparent inconsistency is the ensuing water damage ex-
ception. Exclusion e is quite obviously directed towards a pipe-freezing
situation. The major damage from a frozen pipe in an unoccupied house
is the ensuing water damage that results from the breaking of the pipe.
In fact, without such a broken pipe there is normally no damage. Ex-
clusion e is not subject to the ensuing water exception; thus, if a loss comes
within exclusion e, both the broken pipe and the water damage resulting
therefrom are excluded. However, in any other situation, such as where
the house is occupied, although freezing is excluded by exclusion i (that
is, the loss to the pipe itself is excluded), the ensuing water damage is
covered since exclusion i is subject to the exception. The underwriter is
willing to accept the risk of water damage from an above-the-ground
frozen pipe in an occupied dwelling, but he is not willing to accept this
risk in an unoccupied dwelling without proper precautions. Thus, exclusion
e was necessary to eliminate from the coverage the major portion of dam-
age in the latter situation.
V. THE EXTENSIONS OF COVERAGE
The homeowners policy contains four extensions of coverage,"° two of
which will be mentioned here.
1. Additional Living Expense. Under the additional living expense ex-
tension, an insured is entitled, for living expenses, to a maximum of an
additional twenty per cent of the limit of liability applicable to the
described dwelling, where the loss renders the dwelling untenantable.5 This
is additional insurance giving the insured the possibility of a 120 per cent
recovery of the amount of insurance."
'8386 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error dismissed.
"9 This was the insured's argument in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Voiding, 426 S.W.2d 907,
909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. m.r.e.
"°The four extensions of coverage are entitled: additional living expense and rental value;
trees, shrubs, plants and lawns; replacement cost coverage; consequential loss coverage.
"5 By this extension, the insured is able to recover the reasonable increase in his living expenses,
but only during the period of time reasonably needed to repair the damaged dwelling. Thus, if
the insured fails to prove the time for which substitute lodging is necessary, then he is entitled
to no recovery under this extension. Commercial Ins, Co. v. Colvert, 425 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1968).
"5 This is contrary to the wording of the Texas standard fire insurance physical loss form which
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2. Replacement Cost Coverage. The replacement cost coverage is one
of the real benefits to an insured under the homeowners policy. If certain
conditions are met, it allows the insured to recover the full cost of repair
or replacement of the dwelling (without deduction for depreciation),
regardless of the age of the dwelling."3 In order to be entitled to this cov-
erage, an adequate amount of insurance in relation to the full replacement
cost of the dwelling must be maintained, and actual repairs to or replace-
ment of the building must be performed. The insured cannot recover
more than the amount actually and necessarily expended in so repairing
or replacing the building. The policy forms currently in use" require that
such repairs or replacement be accomplished within 180 days of the loss,
but that the company, when requested in writing, will extend such period
for a time not to exceed 360 days after the loss. No Texas case construing
this coverage extension has been found. However, the limitations and
conditions therein are clear and do not seem to require construction. The
provision requiring repairs within a certain time limit is undoubtedly a
binding provison of the contract."3
VI. THE APPRAISAL PROVISION
Space does not permit a discussion of each of the basic conditions" in
the homeowners policy; however, one basic condition worth mentioning
is the appraisal provision. The appraisal provision requires the insured and
the insurer to have the amount of any property loss determined by two
appraisers and an umpire upon an appropriate request by either party.7
extends 10% of the insurance to additional living expense, but which is a part of the basic insur-
ance and not in addition thereto.
' Under the Texas fire insurance policy, much confusion has arisen as to when the insurer
is entitled to a deduction for depreciation. Some cases indicate that the insurer is not entitled to
such a deduction under a fire policy where the loss is only partial. Farmers Mut. Protective Ass'n
v. Cmerek, 404 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox,
376 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 330 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959). Regardless of the correctness of these decisions, the homeowners form provides in
the basic insuring clause that the company's liability shall not exceed "the amount it would cost
to repair or replace the property with material of like kind and quality, with proper deduction
for depreciation." Thus, as far as the dwelling coverage is concerned, in order to prevent the
insurance company from depreciating the repair costs, the insured must rely upon the replacement
cost coverage.
"Those forms currently in use bear the effective date of July 1, 1963.
" Cf. Ruter v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 467, 178 A.2d 640 (Super.
Ct.), cert. denied, 37 N.J. 229, 181 A.2d 12 (1962).
96 These basic conditions are contained in the homeowners policy jacket, and thus are the same
regardless of the particular homeowners form attached thereto.
'That appraisal provision provides:
If, under Section 1, the Insured and the Company shall fail to agree as to the actual
cash value, the amount of loss, or the cost of repair or replacement, then on the
written demand of either, each shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser
and notify the other of the appraiser selected within 20 days of such demand. Such
appraisers shall first select a competent and disinterested umpire; and failing for 15
days to agree upon such umpire, then, on request of the Insured or the Company,
such umpire shall be selected by a judge of a district court of a judicial district
where the loss occurred. Such appraisers shall then appraise the loss, stating separately
actual cash value and loss to each item; and if the Insured or the Company re-
quests that they do so, the appraisers shall also appraise (a) the full replacement cost
of the described dwelling, (b) the full replacement cost of any building upon which
loss is claimed, and (c) the full cost of repair or replacement of loss (without
deduction for depreciation) to such building; and, failing to agree, shall submit their
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A similar appraisal provision in Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Peters"9
was upheld and found to be a condition precedent to a suit upon the
policy, if properly invoked. The enforceability of the appraisal provision
is noteworthy since it is sometimes confused with arbitration of liability,
upon which Texas has a very restrictive law."
Although it has been stated that the appraisal provision was inserted
in the policy wholly for the benefit and protection of the insurer,"° this
is not always the case, and an insured should not overlook this simple pro-
cedure for determining the amount of his loss when it may be used to
his advantage. Where the only dispute with the company is the extent
of loss, appraisal under the policy without the expense and delay of litiga-
tion should be considered. However, one word of caution is in order.
Many adjusters and insurance companies like to use a printed form en-
titled an "Agreement for Submission to Appraisers" when conducting an
appraisal proceeding. This form is signed by both parties and may not
contain a direction to the appraisers to determine the values necessary to
give the insured credit for the replacement cost coverage mentioned above.
Therefore, care should be used to make certain that in addition to ascer-
taining the actual case value and loss to each item, the appraisers also de-
termine: (a) the full replacement cost of the described dwelling; (b)
the full replacement cost of any building upon which loss is claimed; and
(c) the full cost of repair or replacement of loss (without deduction for
depreciation) to such building.
VII. CONCLUSION
We are fortunate to have a standard homeowners form with all risks
dwelling coverage in such wide use in this state. Precedent is necessarily a
highly important factor when parties use contractual clauses which have
been judicially construed."' Thus, it can be expected that many future
decisions will build upon the solid foundation that has been laid to date.
In most of the past decisions, where an exclusion has been held applicable,
it will be seen upon mature reflection that the loss clearly came within a
particular exclusionary clause. Most of these cases have been decided as a
differences only to the umpire. An award in writing, so itemized, of any two when
filed with the Company, shall determine to the extent so itemized the amount of
actual cash value and loss, the full replacement cost, and the cost of repair or re-
placement. Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting him and the expenses
of appraisal and umpire shall be paid by the parties equally. Such award shall be
binding as between the Insured and the Company.
98 386 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1965) (a suit upon a fire insurance policy). The enforceability of
the appraisal provision has been established by many Texas decisions beginning with Scottish Union
& Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Clancey, 71 Tex. 5, 8 S.W. 630 (1888). See also Fire Ass'n v. Ballard, 112
S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (upholding the appointment of an umpire by a judge in ac-
cordance with the policy provision).
"
9 See Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Construction Co., 348 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961),
error ref. n.r.e.; TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (1965); Carrington, The 1965 General
Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 21 (1966).
0 International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Brodie, 337 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), error
ref. n.r.e.




matter of law. As the insurance selling agents begin to appreciate the
significance of these exclusions, they will probably be more inclined to
sell, for an additional premium, the homeowners policy with special
standard endorsements eliminating one or more of these exclusions."'2
The really difficult and factually involved cases, as well as those with
highly-contested, complex factual issues, have yet to reach the courts. In
fact, the proper or best way to submit the special issues to a jury where a
large number of unrelated exclusions are raised by the evidence or where
there is pre-existent damage has yet to develop."'3 It is to be expected
that, in time, cases will be decided where a specific exclusion has been
deleted from the contract, varying the result to a certain extent from the
decisions to date.1" Proximate cause as applied to the exclusions will un-
doubtedly be clarified in the future decisions, so that it will become clear
exactly which exclusions apply to damage "caused by" the excluded peril,
such as the water exclusion, and which exclusions also apply to loss
consisting of the excluded hazard, such as the settling exclusion. The
outer limits of the inherent vice exclusion as to causation may be au-
thoritatively declared. Some of these more troublesome problems will un-
doubtedly be answered in the next ten-year period in the history of the
Texas homeowners policy.
VIII. APPENDIX
FORM HO-B HOMEOWNERS BROAD FORM
Effective
July 1, 1963 SECTION I - PROPERTY SECTION
Subject to the provisions and conditions of the policy, and of this form and endorsements at-
tached, the Company insures the Named Insured and legal representatives against loss (including
expenses incurred in the removal of debris of property insured resulting from such loss) from any
of the Perils Insured Against to the property hereinafter described. Unless otherwise provided, this
insurance shall apply only at the premises of the dwelling described on Page 1, and liability of the
Company shall not exceed: the specified Limits of Liability; nor, the actual cash value of the
property at the time of loss ascertained with proper deduction for depreciation; nor, the amount
it would cost to repair or replace the property with material of like kind and quality, with proper
deduction for depreciation, within a reasonable time after the loss without allowance for any in-
creased cost of repair or reconstruction by reason of any ordinance or law regulating construction
or repair; nor shall it exceed the interest of the Insured.
PROPERTY INSURED
COVERAGE A-DWELLING, as described on Page 1 of this policy, while occupied by the Insured
principally for dwelling purposes.
Wall-to-wall carpeting attached to a building shall be considered a part of such building.
DWELLING EXTENSION-The Insured may apply up to 10% (in the aggregate) of the
Limit of Liability applicable to the described dwelling as additional insurance to cover other
private structures on the premises used in connection with the occupancy of the dwelling and
not in contact therewith.
EXCLUSION: This dwelling extension does not cover any structure used for commercial,
102 E.g., form No. HO-353 is available to eliminate exclusions d(2) and d(3), the sewer back-
up and sub-surface water exclusions.
103 See, e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. v. Colvert, 425 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (involving
pre-existing damage). From that case it seems clear that the insured's recovery was not properly
reduced by pre-existing damage considerations or other factors, yet it is extremely difficult to
decide where or how the error was made.
1"E.g., if the sub-surface water exclusion is eliminated, as mentioned in note 102 supra, this
does not mean that settling thereby becomes covered. That is, exclusion k still excludes such
loss, but it would mean that because of the ensuing loss exception, any ensuing collapse caused
by the settling would be covered.
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manufacturing or farming purposes; nor any structure wholly rented to others, except pri-
vate garages used exclusively as such.
COVERAGE B-UNSCHEDULED PERSONAL PROPERTY owned, worn or used by the Insured,
including members of his family of the same household and, at the option of the Insured, property
of others (except roomers or tenants) while on the premises of the described dwelling.
Window or wall air-conditioning units shall be considered personal property.
EXCLUSIONS-Coverage B does not cover:
a. Animals and birds; aircraft; motor vehicles, except power mowers, golf buggies and farm
equipment not designed for use principally on public roads; trailers and semi-trailers, except
such vehicles (other than house trailers) designed for use principally off public roads and
except boat trailers while on the premises of the described dwelling;
b. Outboard motors, watercraft, their furnishings and equipment except while on land on the
premises of the described dwelling;
c. Loss of money or numismatic property in excess of $100 (any one loss);
d. Loss in excess of $500 (any one loss) of manuscripts, notes, securities, stamps including phil-
atelic property, accounts, bills, deeds, evidences of debt, letters of credit, passports, docu-
ments, or transportation or other tickets;
e. Loss in excess of $500 (any one loss) of gems, watches, jewelry or furs. This exclusion, how-
ever, shall not apply to loss by the Perils of Fire and Lightning; Smoke; Explosion; Riot and
Civil Commotion; Windstorm, Hurricane and Hail; Aircraft and Vehicles; as these perils are
hereinafter conditioned and limited;
f. Loss in excess of $500 (any one loss) of property pertaining to a ranch, farm, business, trade,
profession or occupation of the Insured but all loss to such property is excluded:
(1) if the property consists of samples or articles for sale or delivery, or
(2) if the property is away from the described premises;
g. Property separately described and specifically insured under this or any other policy.
OFF PREMISES COVERAGE-Subject to the provisions and conditions of this policy and the
exclusions and limitations therein, Coverage B also covers, as additional insurance, unscheduled
personal property (except property usually rented to others) owned, worn or used by the Insured,
including members of his family of the same household, anywhere in the world.
Such Off Premises Coverage, however, shall be limited to $1,000 or 10% of the Limit of Liability
applicable to Coverage B, whichever is greater. The Insured may, at his option, include in this Off
Premises Coverage personal property of a residence employee at locations other than the employee's
residence, but only while the employee is actually engaged in the service of the Insured and such
property is in the physical custody of such employee.
PERILS INSURED AGAINST
Property as described and limited under Coverage A is insured against:
ALL RISKS OF PHYSICAL LOSS except as otherwise excluded.
Unscheduled Personal Property as described and limited under Coverage B is insured against loss by:
FIRE AND LIGHTNING;
SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE FROM SMOKE;
WINDSTORM, HURRICANE AND HAIL;
EXPLOSION;
AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLES;
VANDALISM AND MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-meaning only the willful and malicious damage
to or destruction of the property insured;
RIOT AND CIVIL COMMOTION-including direct loss from pillage and looting occurring
during and at the immediate place of a riot or civil commotion;
COLLAPSE OF BUILDING or any part thereof;
ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE, LEAKAGE OR OVERFLOW OF WATER OR STEAM used
within a plumbing, heating or air-conditioning system or a domestic appliance;
FALLING OBJECTS-provided the building containing the property covered shall first sustain an
actual damage to the exterior of the building by the falling object;
FREEZING of domestic appliances;
THEFT, larceny, burglary, robbery, or attempts thereat, and mysterious disappearance.
EXCLUSIONS (Applicable to Property Insured under Coverages A and B and Perils Insured
Against)-This insurance does not cover:
a. Loss to electrical appliances, devices, or wiring caused by electricity, other than lightning;
b. Loss caused by smog; nor by smoke from industrial or agricultural operations;
c. Loss caused by Windstorm, Hurricane and Hail to:
(1) cloth awnings; greenhouses and their contents; buildings or structures located wholly or
partially over water and property therein or thereon;
(2) radio and television towers, masts and antennas, including lead-in wiring; wind chargers
and windmills;
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(3) personal property within a building caused by rain, snow, sand or dust, all whether driven
by wind or not, unless the wind or hail shall first make an opening in the walls or roof
of the building, and the Company shall then be liable only for loss to the insured property
therein, caused immediately by rain, snow, sand or dust entering the building through such
opening;
d. Loss caused by or resulting from:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water or tidal wave, overflow of streams or other bodies
of water, or spray from any of the foregoing, all whether driven by wind or not;
(2) water which backs up through sewers or drains;
(3) water below the surface of the ground including that which exerts pressure on (or flows,
seeps or leaks through) sidewalks, driveways, swimming pools, foundations, walls, basement
or other floors, or through doors, windows or any other openings in such sidewalks, drive-
ways, foundations, walls or floors;
Exclusion d does not apply to loss by theft, larceny, burglary, robbery or attempts thereat;
e. Loss caused by or resulting from freezing while the building is unoccupied unless the Insured
shall have exercised due diligence with respect to maintaining heat in the building or unless
plumbing, heating and air-conditioning systems had been drained and the water supply shut off
during such unoccupancy;
f. Loss by:
(1) theft, larceny, burglary, robbery, or attempts thereat, or by mysterious disappearance, of:
(a) personal property while in or on, or on the premises of, any dwelling (other than the
described dwelling) owned, rented or occupied by an Insured, except while an Insured
is temporarily residing therein;
(b) building materials and supplies not on the premises of the described dwelling;
(2) mysterious disappearance of an unmounted gem or a gem from its setting;
g. Loss caused by earthquake, landslide or other earth movement;
h. Loss to machinery, appliances and mechanical devices caused by mechanical breakdown;
i. Loss caused by inherent vice, wear and tear, deterioration; rust, rot, mould or other fungi;
dampness of atmosphere, extremes of temperature; contamination; vermin, termites, moths or
other insects;
j. Loss caused by animals or birds owned or kept by the Insured, a member of his household or
an occupant of the premises;
k. Loss under Coverage A caused by settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion of founda-
tions, walls, floors, ceilings, roof structures, walks, drives, curbs, fences, retaining walls or
swimming pools.
The foregoing Exclusions a through k shall not apply to ensuing loss caused by fire, smoke or
explosion and Exclusions i, j and k shall not apply to ensuing loss caused by collapse of building,
or any part thereof, water damage or breakage of glass which constitutes a part of the building,
provided such losses would otherwise be covered under this policy.
EXTENSIONS OF COVERAGE
ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSE AND RENTAL VALUE: If loss resulting from any of the
Perils Insured Against hereunder renders the insured property wholly or partially untenantable,
the Company agrees to pay, not to exceed 20% of the Limit of Liability applicable to the described
dwelling, as additional insurance:
a. the necessary and reasonable increase in living expense to continue as nearly as practicable
the normal standard of living of the Insured's household caused by such untenantability;
b. an amount to cover the loss of fair rental value (less expenses which do not continue) of
that portion of the described dwelling or private structure usually rented to others, caused
by such untenantability.
Loss hereunder shall be computed commencing with the date of loss and extend for (but not
limited by the expiration of this policy) the time required, with the exercise of due diligence and
dispatch, to repair or replace such damaged or destroyed property, but it shall not extend beyond
the time required for the Insured's household to become settled in permanent quarters.
TREES, SHRUBS, PLANTS AND LAWNS-within the specified Limit of Liability applicable to
the described dwelling, the Insured may apply up to 5% of such limit to trees, shrubs, plants and
lawns on the described premises against loss by fire and lightning, explosion, aircraft and vehicles,
vandalism and malicious mischief, riot and civil commotion, theft and attempted theft. Trees,
shrubs, plants and lawns are not otherwise insured under this policy.
EXCLUSIONS--This insurance shall not cover:
a. Trees, shrubs, plants or lawns grown for commercial purposes;
b. Loss in excess of $250 on any one tree, shrub or plant, including cost of removal thereof;
c. Loss caused by a vehicle owned or operated by an occupant of the premises of the described
dwelling.
REPLACEMENT COST COVERAGE-If at the time of loss the limit of liability applicable to
the described dwelling is 80% or more of the full replacement cost of said dwelling, the coverage
of the policy applicable to the building structure suffering loss is extended to include the full cost
of repair or replacement (without deduction for depreciation).
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If at the time of loss the Limit of Liability applicable to the described dwelling is less than 80%
of the full replacement cost of such described dwelling, the Company shall be liable for that pro-
portion of the full cost of repair or replacement (without deduction for depreciation) of that part
of the building damaged or destroyed which the Limit of Liability applicable to the described
dwelling bears to 80% of the full replacement cost of said described dwelling.
In no event shall the Company's liability be less than its liability under the terms and conditions
of this policy disregarding this replacement cost coverage.
In determining full replacement cost, the value of excavations, underground pipes, wiring and
foundations which are below the surface of the ground may be disregarded. This replacement cost
coverage shall not apply to wall-to-wall carpeting attached to such building structure or to cloth
awnings.
The Insured shall elect in writing at the time Proof of Loss is made in accordance with the pro-
visions of this policy whether claim is made under the policy for the loss disregarding this replace-
ment cost coverage, or whether claim is made under the policy including this replacement cost
coverage.
In accordance with the provisions of this form and of the policy at the time Proof of Loss is made,
the Insured shall specify the amount claimed under the policy for the loss disregarding this re-
placement cost coverage and, if applicable, shall also specify the amount claimed under this ex-
tension of coverage.
The amount of loss, disregarding replacement cost coverage, for which the Company may be liable
shall be payable as provided in the Basic Conditions of the policy.
Such additional amount as may be claimed under this extension of coverage shall not become pay-
able until actual repair or replacement of the damaged or destroyed building structure is com-
pleted, which repair or replacement shall be identical with such building structure and on the same
premises and intended for the same use and occupancy, within 180 days after the loss. If requested
in writing by the Insured the Company will extend such period for a time not to exceed 360
days after loss.
If the Insured elects to make claim under this replacement cost coverage, the Company shall not
be liable for more than the amount actually and necessarily expended in repairing or replacing such
building structure damaged or destroyed or any part thereof identical with such building and on
the same premises and intended for the same use and occupancy, and in no event shall the Com-
pany be liable beyond the limit of liability of this policy applicable to the damaged or destroyed
building structure(s).
CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS COVERAGE-Property insured hereunder while contained inside a
building on the premises of the described dwelling, is insured against loss due to change of tempera-
ture as the direct result of physical damage to the said dwelling, or equipment therein, caused by
a peril insured against.
